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NOTE

NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE § 47-01-15: DETERMINING NORTH DAKOTA'S INTEREST IN THE BEDS OF
NAVIGABLE WATERS

I. INTRODUCTION
Two recent North Dakota cases, State v. Andrus1 and 101 Ranch
v. United States,2 determined that because the Little Missouri River
and Devils Lake were navigable in fact at the time of statehood, the
State of North Dakota acquired the beds of these water bodies to
the ordinary high watermark.3 These decisions raise issues of great
concern to both the State and to landowners who own land along
navigable waters. Although these cases address the State's interest
in the beds at the date of statehood, the State's present interest in
the beds has yet to be adequately determined.
Generally, this Note will analyze the interests of the State of
North Dakota and riparians in the beds of navigable waters.
Specifically, it will analyze the effect of section 47-01-154 of the
North Dakota Century Code on the State's interest in the beds of
navigable waters. It will attempt to determine what interest the
State and riparians have in that portion of the bed between the high
and low watermarks. The statute will be discussed in light of
territorial and state history. Various subissues will be addressed in
determining whether an interpretation of section 47-01-15 as a
1. 671 F.2d 271 (8th Cir.), cert. grantedsubnom. Block v. State, 103 S. Ct. 48 (1982).
2. No. A2-81-89 (D.N.D. Dec. 21, 1981) (order granting first partial summary judgment
motion).
3. See State v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271, 278 (8th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Block v. State, 103 S.
Ct. 48 (1982); 101 Ranch v. United States, No. A2-81-89 (D.N.D. Dec. 21, 1981) (order granting
first partial summary judgment motion).
4. N.D. CENT. CoDE § 47-01-15 (1978).
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grant in fee from the State of North Dakota to riparians is
precluded by the statute's territorial precedent, the public trust
doctrine, and the North Dakota Constitution.
II. BOUNDARY ISSUE RELATING TO BEDS OF NAVIGABLE WATERS
The State of North Dakota entered the Union on an equal
footing with the original states and acceded to sovereignty over the
beds of navigable waters within the state. 5 The beds of navigable
waters are sovereign public trust lands of the State of North
Dakota. 6 Because these beds are subject to the public trust doctrine,
7
the State has a duty to protect the public interest in these lands.
However, the State through its elected officials, in particular prior
5. State v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 27i, 276-77 (8th Cir.), cert. grantedsub nom. Block v. State, 103 S.
Ct. 48 (1982). Although navigability is a federal question, the North Dakota Supreme Court has
addressed the issue. See Ozark-Mahoning Co. v. State, 76 N.D. 464, 37 N.W.2d 488 (1949). In
Ozark-Mahoning the court stated, "Upon the admission of a state to the Union, the title of the United
States to lands underlying navigable waters within the state passes to it as incident to the transfer to
the state of local sovereignty .... " Id. at 467, 37 N.W.2d at 490 (citing United States v. Oregon,
295 U.S. 1 (1935)). See also State v. Brace, 76 N.D. 314, 36 N.W.2d 330 (1949) (State acquired the
beds of navigable waters "subject to the limitation of the commerce clause of the federal
constitution"); State v. Loy, 74 N.D. 182, 20 N.W.2d 668 (1945) (when "North Dakota became a
state it acquired title to the lands under all navigable waters within its borders and complete
dominion over such lands subject only to the limitations of the Commerce Clause of the Federal
Constitution").
The operation of the equal footing doctrine accords newly admitted states the same property
interests in submerged lands as the thirteen original states enjoyed as successors to the British
Crown. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 222-23 (1845).
6. Andrus, 671 F.2d at 274. Addressing the status of the beds of the Little Missouri River, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated:
In the present suit North Dakota is asserting title to lands which would be public trust
lands if held by the State. Public trust lands are held in trust for the citizens of a state
and they are distinguished from lands which the State holds in a proprietary capacity.
Title to public trust lands is an attribute ofstate sovereignty.
Id. (citations omitted). The court found that "frlather than arising under congressional grant, title to
public trust lands is vested in the states by the Constitution." Id. The court noted that "ft]he
Supreme Court of North Dakota has held that lands beneath navigable waters are held in trust for
the public." Id. at 274 n.5 (citing United Plainsmen Ass'n v. State Water Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d
457, 461 (N.D. 1976)).
7. The control and management of the beds of North Dakota's navigable waters are divided
between the Board of University and School Lands and the board of directors of the Garrison
I)ivcrsion Conservancy District. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-08 (1978) (control and management of
the beds, except such beds within the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District, are in the Board of
University and School Lands); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-24-08(13) (Supp. 1981) (board ofdirectors of
the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District has the power to control and manage the beds of
navigable waters within the district).
During the first sixty years of the State's history no particular agency was entrusted with the
control and management responsibilities over such lands. See N.D. REVISED CODE § 47-0608 (1943).
In 1953, however, 1 47-0608 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 was amended to authorize
the Bank ofNorth Dakota to control and manage the beds of navigable waters. Act of Mar. 13, 1953,
ch. 276, § 1, 1953 N.D. Sess. Laws 446. The creation of subsection 13 of § 61-24-08 of the North
I)akota Century Code divided the Bank of North Dakota's authority. Act of Mar. 10, 1967, ch. 476,
5 2, 1967 N.1). Sess. Laws 1132, 1133. Subsection 13 authorizes the board of directors of the
(;arrison l)iversion Conservancy District to control and manage the beds of navigable waters within
the conservancy district "as now constituted or may thereafter be modified west of the ninety-eighth
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attorneys general, has not always discharged this duty. 8 As a result,
the State's interest in the beds of its navigable waters may be in
jeopardy.
Recently, North Dakota and its western neighbors began
reasserting authority over their sovereign land grants and
exercising their public trust responsibilities over such lands. 9 One
example of this is an action brought by the State of North Dakota
meridian." N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-24-08(13) (Supp. 1981). Because the twenty-five counties that
presently are part of the district were part of the district in 1967, the board has management
authority over the beds within the entire district. Id. See In re Garrison Diversion Conservancy Dist.,
144 N.W.2d 82, 87 (1966). Also in 1967, § 47-06-08 of the North Dakota Century Code was
amended to prohibit the Bank of North Dakota from managing lands within the Garrison Diversion
Conservancy District. Act of Mar. 10, 1967, ch. 476, § 1, 1967 N.D. Sess. Laws 1132. In 1977 an
amendment to 5 47-06-08 substituted the Board of University and School Lands for the Bank of
North Dakota as the agency with authority to control and manage the beds of navigable waters
outside the conservancy district. Act of Apr. 19, 1977, ch. 144, §3, 1977 N.D. Sess. Laws 324, 326.
Therefore, it appears that the State of North Dakota has a bifurcated system of management and
control over the beds of navigable waters.
8. The attorneys general's failure to protect the State's sovereign public trust interests in the
beds is impliedly at issue in 101 Ranch v. UnitedStates. See State's Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment at 6, 101 Ranch v. United States, No. A2-81-89 (D.N.D. Sept. 17,
1982) (order granting second partial summary judgment motion). The 101 Ranch case is a quiet title
action to determine ownership of the West Bay of Devils Lake. State's Memorandum at 5-6. A future
issue will be the validity of default judgments entered against the State of North Dakota in actions
brought between 1925 and 1941 by the landowners' predecessors in interest. Id. at 6.
These default judgment cases are best exemplified by Bgre v. Greenfield. See Brye v. Greenfield, 70
N.D. 597, 296 N.W. 746 (1941). In Brye a private landowner brought an action to quiet title to land
that was part of the dry portion of the West Bay of Devils Lake. Plaintiff's Complaint at 1, Brye v.
Greenfield, 70 N.D. 597, 296 N.W. 746 (1941). The State of North Dakota was named a defendant,
and Attorney General Alvin C. Strutz admitted service. Plaintiff's Complaint at 1. Strutz requested
that plaintiffs provide the source of title to the lands uncovered by the recession of the waters of
Devils Lake. Letter from Assistant Attorney General C. E. Brace to Clyde Duffy (May 17, 1940).
Plaintiff's attorney Clyde Duffy responded that "the dry bed of Devils Lake has been claimed by the
adjoining owners under the doctrine of Roberts v. Taylor, 47 N.D. 146." Letter from Clyde Duffy to
Assistant Attorney General C. E. Brace (May 20, 1940). The State demurred and alleged that "the
complaint does not show what possible claim to the property the State may have." Defendant's Brief
in Support of Demurrer at 3 (July 6, 1940), Brye v. Greenfield, 70 N.D. 597, 296 N.W. 746 (1941).
The district court overruled the demurrer, and the State appealed. Brye, 70 N.D. at 598, 296 N.W. at
747. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the order overruling the demurrer. Id.
In Bove the North Dakota Attorney General failed to protect the public interest in the beds of
navigable waters because he did not assert that the State owned the bed of Devils Lake to the
ordinary high watermark. See id. The North Dakota Supreme Court has stated that "if the attorney
for the State fails to protect the rights and interests of the State in any litigation, and this failure
becomes apparent to the court, the court should see that the public interests are protected." Farmers
Ins. Exch. v. Nagle, 190 N.W.2d 758, 763 (N.D. 1971).
9. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). In Montana the United States filed a
declaratory action to quiet title to the Big Horn River bed in the United States. The Supreme Court
concluded "that title to the bed of the Big Horn River passed to the State of Montana upon its
admission into the Union." Id. at 556-57. See also Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971); State v.
Andrus, 671 F.2d 271 (8th Cir.), cert. grantedsubnom. Block v. State, 103 S.Ct. 48 (1982); 101 Ranch
v. United States, No. A2-81-89 (D.N.D. Dec. 21, 1981) (order granting first partial summary
judgment).
The State of Utah initiated Utah v. United States to resolve a dispute between Utah and the
United States over ownership of the shorelands around the Great Salt Lake. 403 U.S. at 9. The
Special Master reported that the lake was navigable at statehood, and therefore, under the equal
footing doctrine the Court granted Utah's claim to the original bed. Id. at 10. State v. Andrus is an
action to quiet title to the bed of the Little Missouri River in North Dakota. See 671 F.2d at 273. The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that "the Little
Missouri River in North Dakota was navigable in fact on the date of North Dakota's statehood, and
hence that title to the bed of the stream originally vested with the State of North Dakota." Id.
101 Ranch is a quiet title action brought by riparian landowners seeking to quiet title to the bed
of West Bay, Devils Lake. State's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment at 1, 101 Ranch v. United States, No. A2-81-89 (D.N.D. Sept. 17, 1982) (order granting
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under the Federal Quiet Title Act10 to quiet title to the bed of the
Little Missouri River in the State. 1 ' In State v. Andrus12 the district
court declared that the Little Missouri River was navigable at
statehood, that title therefore vested in the State of North Dakota,
and that the State cannot be defeated in its claim to the bed.13 The
district court's decision was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit. 14
The extent of North Dakota's interest in the beds of navigable
waters must be ascertained. ' 5 The State of North Dakota acquired
the beds of navigable lakes and streams to the ordinary high
watermark 6 as an incident of statehood. 17 While acceding to
ownership of the beds to the high watermark, the new state also
acceded to the laws of the Dakota Territory. 18 One provision of the
second partial summary judgment motion). The action was initially brought against the United
States. State's Memorandum at 1.The Garrison Diversion Conservancy District and the State of
North Dakota, however, intervened as party defendants because of the State's interest in the land.
Id. at 1-2. The State of North Dakota is disposing of the issues by a series of summary judgment
motions. Id. at 24. The district court determined that "the State of North Dakota acquired the bed
(i.e., all land below the ordinary high watermark) of West Bay, Devils Lake, as an incident of
statehood." 101 Ranch v. United States, No. A2-81-89 (D.N.D. Dec. 21, 1981) (order granting first
partial summary judgment motion). The district court also determined that the ordinary high
watermark of West Bay, Devils Lake is the meander line. 101 Ranch v. United States, No. A2-81-89
(D.N.D. Sept. 17, 1982) (order granting second partial summary judgment motion).
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1976). Congress waived sovereign immunity in § 2409a(a), which
provides that "[t]he United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action under this
section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest,
other than a security interest or water rights." Id. §2409a(a).
11. SeeState v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271(8th Cir.), cert. grantedsubnom. Block v.State, 103 S. Ct. 48
(1982).
12. 506 F. Supp. 619 (D.N.D. 1981).
13. State v. Andrus, 506 F. Supp. 619, 624 (D.N.D. 1981).
14. Andrus, 671 F.2d at 278.
15. The ownership boundary, which divides the bed of navigable waters from the adjacent
uplands, is described in terms of ordinary high watermark and ordinary low watermark. The
traditional measure of the bed of inland navigable waters has been the ordinary or mean high
watermark. See Alabama v. Georgia, 64 U.S. 505 (1859) (dispute over state boundaries as demarked
by the Chattahoochee River). The ordinary high watermark is significant for the following reasons:
Since the title to lands underlying navigable waters within a state, where such title is
held in a sovereign capacity, is vested in the state rather than in the United States, the
Federal Government has no power to convey title to such lands .... Accordingly, a
patent from the United States to lands adjoining a navigable stream or body of water
extends only to the high watermark, and does not affect the title of the state to the land
below the high-water mark.
78 AM. JUR. 2D Waters § 402 (1975).
The ordinary high watermark "has been defined as the line to which the water rises in the
seasons of ordinary high water, or the line at which the presence of water is continued for such length
of time as to mark upon the soil and vegetation a distinct character." Id. §387. The term is defined
by North Dakota statute as "that line reached by water when the lake or stream is ordinarily full and
the water ordinarily high." N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-15-01 (1960). The low watermark of a river has
been defined as "the point to which the river recedes at its lowest stage." Conran v. Girvan, 341
S.W.2d 75, 81 (Mo. 1960).
16. See 101 Ranch v. United States, No. A2-81-89 (D.N.D. Dec. 21, 1981) (order granting first
partial summary judgment motion). The court defined the bed as "all land below the ordinary high
watermark." Id.
17. SeeAndrus, 671 F.2d at 276. The court held that if the Little Missouri River was navigable at
statehood, title to the beds vested in the State of North Dakota at that time. Id.
18. North Dakota Constitution, schedule, 1890 N.D. Sess. Laws 54, repealed by North Dakota
Constitution art. amend. 100, ch. 691, § 1, 1979 N.D. Sess. Laws 1726. Section 2 of the schedule

1983]

NOTE

215

Dakota Territory Civil Code provides that "[e]xcept where the
grant under which the land is held indicates a different intent, the
owner of the upland when it borders upon a navigable lake or
stream, takes to the edge of the lake or stream at low-water
mark." 19 To ascertain the State's interest in the beds of navigable
waters, courts must interpret section 47-01-15 of the North Dakota
Century Code. 20 If the statute is a grant of that portion of the bed
between the high and low watermarks, riparians who border
navigable waters would own in fee to the low watermark.
The headnote of section 47-01-15, "Banks and beds of streams
Boundary of ownership," suggests that the provision is a grant
of fee ownership to the low watermark.2 1 At statehood, however,
the statute contained only the "Banks and beds of streams"
language.2 2 The easiest way to resolve this query is to recognize
that headnotes do not constitute any part of a statute.23 No North
Dakota cases have directly addressed the ownership issue. In
several cases, however, the North Dakota Supreme Court assumed
that section 47-01-15 grants a fee interest to the low watermark to
24
riparians who own land along navigable waters.
implementing the transition from a territory to statehood provided: "All laws now in force in the
territory of Dakota, which are not repugnant to this [North Dakota] Constitution, shall remain in
force until they expire by their own limitations or be altered or repealed." North Dakota
Constitution, schedule, 1890 N.D. Sess. Laws 54.
19. TERR. DAK. Civ. CODE § 266 (1877). Section 266 was the predecessor of § 47-01-15 of the
North Dakota Century Code, which exists almost unchanged from territorial days. Beck, Boundary
Litigation andLegislationin North Dakota, 41 N.D.L. REV. 424, 437 n.51 (1965).
20. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15 (1978).
21. See id.
22. TERR. DAK. Civ. CODE § 266. The additional headnote language, "Boundary of
Ownership," was added in the Revised Code of 1943. See N.D. REVISED CODE § 47-0115 (1943)
(currently codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15 (1978)). The provision had been revised in 1895,
1899, 1905, and 1913 without a change in the headnote language. See N.D. REVISED CODE § 3373
(1895); id. § 3373 (1899); id. 4809 (1905); N.D. COMPILED LAWS § 5352 (1913) (currently codified

at N.D.

CENT. CODE §

47-01-15 (1978)).

23. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-12 (1975) ("[n]o headnote, source note, or cross-reference,
whether designating an entire title, chapter, section, subsection, or subdivision, shall constitute any
part of a statute").
24. See Hogue v. Bourgois, 71 N.W.2d 47 (N.D. 1955). In Hogue the court stated that "the
owner of lands riparian to a navigable stream owns title to the low watermark." Id. at 52. Although
the ownership issue was unnecessary to the disposition of the case, the Hague court applied this
statement as the basis for the rule that "title of the State of North Dakota to lands below low
watermark of a navigable stream is coextensive with the bedof the stream as it may exist from time to
time." Id.
See also State v. Loy, 74 N.D. 182, 20 N.W.2d 668 (1945). In determining the extent of grants
from the United States to riparians along the Missouri River, the court in Loy noted that the "State
of North Dakota recognizes that the boundaries of lands bordering on navigable streams extend to
the low watermark." Id. at 190, 20 N.W.2d at 671. But see Gardner v. Green, 67 N.D. 268, 271
N.W. 775 (1937). The Green decision was cited in both Hogue and Loy. Hogue, 71 N.W.2d at 52; Loy,
74 N.D. at 190, 20 N.W.2d at 671. The Green court, however, merely quoted 5 5352 of the North
Dakota Compiled Laws, currently codified as § 47-01-15 of the North Dakota Century Code, to
support the proposition that "there is no reservation in the state of title to accretions on navigable
rivers." 67 N.D. at 277, 271 N.W. at 780. SeeN.D. Cent. Code §47-01-15 (1978).
Accretions are defined as the gradual and imperceptible additions to land by the deposit of silt
and sediment along the edge of the water, which result in extending the land into the water. 78 AM.
JUR. 2D WATERS § 406 (1975). As a general rule the margin of the stream bed is changed by these
accretions, and the accretions form the new boundary of the tract. Id. Therefore, the owner of
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North Dakota courts have failed to adequately address the
ownership issue primarily because the State has never raised the
issue in litigation. 25 As a general rule of constitutional law, a court
will not construe the constitutionality of a statute until it is properly
and necessarily before the court. 26 The court's lack of guidance is
justified because the State has never raised any issue involving the
interpretation or constitutionality of section 47-01-15. Because of
the sovereign public trust character of the land and the
Gorresponding public interests involved, the State should properly
raise the issue before the courts at the first opportunity.
III.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF
NAVIGABLE WATERS

TITLE

TO

BEDS

OF

A. NAVIGABILITY
The threshold question in determining a state's interest in the
27
beds of lakes and streams is whether they are navigable.
Navigability as it relates to a state's ownership of the beds of lakes
riparian lands acquires title to all subsequent additions and loses title to lands wasted away by water
erosion. Hogue, 71 N.W.2d at 52.
25. State officials possibly could justify their failure to challenge riparian claims by arguing that
article IX, 5 9 of the North Dakota Constitution applies to public lands that lie between the high and
low watermarks of navigable waters. Section 9 states in part: "No claim for the occupation,
cultivation or improvement of any public lands shall ever be recognized, nor shall such occupation,
cultivation or improvement of any public lands ever be used to diminish either directly or indirectly,
the purchase price of said lands." N.D. CONST. art. IX, § 9. This section constitutionalizes the
common law rule that no claim of adverse possession is valid against a sovereign. See Weber v. Board
of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. 57, 70 (1873) (a state cannot lose or be deprived of its property through
the neglect of its officials). State officials could logically infer that no action on their part was
necessary to protect these lands because mere occupation by riparians could never ripen into title. Id.
Riparians could, of course, argue that § 47-01-15 of the North Dakota Century Code grants title in
fee to the lands between the high and low watermarks. The State, however, could respond that as
long as § 47-01-15 has not yet been construed by the courts, the section merely gives riparians color
of title. Consequently, this mere color of title would be insufficient to withstand the adverse
possession proscription of article IX, § 9 of the North Dakota Constitution.
26. See Hazelton-Moffit Special School Dist. v. Ward, 107 N.W.2d 636 (N.D. 1961). The court
stated:
As a general rule the constitutionality of a statute cannot be first raised on appeal
in a civil proceeding, and a court will not pass upon a constitutional question, except
when such question is properly before it and necessarily involved. The court should
not of its own volition go outside of the record and search for reasons for annulling a
statute, nor should they conjure up theories to overturn and overthrow.
Id. at 646 (citing McCoy v. Davis, 38 N.D. 328, 164 N.W. 951 (1917)).
27. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 6 (1935) (principal issue turns on whether the disputed
land lie under navigable waters). The word navigabilityhas been used in the following contexts:
A. Navigability:"Rivers & HarborsActs.The regulatory authority delegated to the Secretary of the
Army by the 1890 and 1899 Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Acts extends to "navigable waters
of the United States." 33 U.S.C. §401 (1976). The classic definition of navigability was adopted by
the United States Supreme Court in The DanielBall. SeeThe Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 551 (1870). In Ball
the Court defined navigability in terms of navigability in fact: Bodies of water that are navigable in
fact are those that are used or may be used as "highways for commerce." Id. at 563. The current
interpretation of navigability has been expanded to include those waterways that might be made
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and streams is a federal question, 28 the standards of which have
29
developed over a long line of United States Supreme Court cases.
Navigability for title purposes is a question of navigability in fact on
the date of statehood. 30 In The Daniel Ball" the United States
Supreme Court formulated the basic definition of navigable waters:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers
in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable
in fact when they are used ...in their ordinary condition,
as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel
are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade
32
and travel on water.
Although The Daniel Ball was an admiralty case, 33 the cases that
have dealt directly with the issue of navigability for title purposes
have adopted the Daniel Ball definition of navigability as the basic
federal test for locating those submerged beds to which the states
hold title under the federal public trust doctrine. 34
The current "federal title test" of navigability contains five
important elements, four of which are included in the definition of
navigable with reasonable improvements. See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Co., 311 U.S.
377, 407 (1940).
B. Navigability: Clean WaterAct. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
define navigable waters as "the waters of the U.S., including the territorial seas." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(7) (1978). A court interpreted this definition to include all geographical waters of the United
States as used in the Rivers & Harbors Acts. Natural Resource Defense Council v. Calloway, 392 F.
Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975).
C. Navigability: State Police Power. To exercise its police power over certain lakes, the North
Dakota Legislative Assembly defined a navigable lake as "any lake which shall have been meandered
and its metes and bounds established by the government of the United States in the survey of public
lands." See N.D. CENT. CoDE § 61-15-01 (1960). Government surveyors used meander lines as the
boundary of inland navigable waters when they conducted surveys of the public lands adjacent to
such waters. Rather than measuring the sinuosities of the slope line of a lake or stream, meander
lines are a series of short lines along the shore used as an approximation of the boundary. Beck, supra
note 19, at 432.
D. Navigability: State Ownership of the Bed. This is the subject of much of the text and will be
discussed in detail under section III A infra.
28. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14
(1935); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 564 (1870). In United States v. Oregon the Court stated that
navigability is a federal question because "the effect upon the title to such lands is the result of
federal action in admitting a state to the Union." 295 U.S. at 14. The Court reasoned, therefore,
that navigability is "to be determined according to the law and usages recognized and applied in the
federal courts" even if "the waters are not capable of use for navigation in interstate or foreign
commerce. " Id.
29. See, e.g., Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971) (because the Great Salt Lake was
navigable at statehood, the State of Utah acceded to ownership of the beds); United States v.
Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935) (title of the United States to land underlying nonnavigable waters
remains unaffected by the creation of a new state).
30. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. at 14.
31. 77 U.S. 551 (1870).
32. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 551, 563 (1870).
33. Id. at 558.
34. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 513,
592 (1975).
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navigability framed by The DanielBall.35 First, the water body must
have been "susceptible" to navigation at the time of statehood,
rather than requiring any actual use for navigation. 36 Second, it
must have been susceptible to navigation "for commerce." ' 37
Commerce in this context, however, does not require that waters be
navigable in interstate or foreign commerce. Therefore a water
body can be landlocked and still be navigable for purposes of state
ownership of the beds. 38 Third, the water body must be susceptible
to navigation in its "natural and ordinary condition," although
navigation for title purposes will not be destroyed by "occasional
difficulties in navigation. 39 Fourth, the navigation for commerce
can be by any "customary mode" of trade or travel. 40 The fifth
element is that navigability for purposes of determining the
ownership of the beds of water bodies will be tested on the date a
particular state enters the Union. 41 Underlying the federal test is
the proposition that courts should liberally apply the legal
42
standards to establish the existence of these elements.
B. THE "EQUAL FOOTING" DOCTRINE
If a water body is navigable in fact on the date of a state's
admission to the Union, ownership of the bed below such waters
vests in the state as an incident of state sovereignty. 43 United States
Supreme Court decisions have clearly and consistently held that a
basic attribute of state sovereignty is the title to the beds of its
navigable lakes and streams. 44 As a general principle the federal
35. Id. SeeThe Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563.
36. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 83 (1931). The Court stated that the susceptibility of
use in commerce rather than actual use determines navigability and that this capacity may be showui
by physical characteristics and experimentation as well as by the uses to which the waters have been
put. Id.
37. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563.
38. See United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 75. The Court said that it was undisputed that certain
ofthe waters in question were navigable only within the State of Utah. Id. Yet the Court held that the
waters were navigable for purposes ofdetermining ownership of the bed. Id. at 89.
39. See United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1926); Economy Light & Power Co.
v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921). In Economy the Court declared that "navigability in the sense
of the law is not destroyed because the water course is interrupted by occasional natural obstructions
Or portages, nor need the navigation be open at all seasons of the year or at all stages ofwinter." 256
U.S. at 122.
40. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563. The Supreme Court has not yet defined what is a
"customary mode." One extreme position would define the commercial floating of logs to be a
"customary mode." See State v. Andrus, 506 F. Supp. 619,623 (D.N.D. 1981).
41. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1971).
42. See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. at 11; Andrus, 671 F.2d at 278. In concluding that the
Great Salt Lake was navigable, the Supreme Court in Utah v. United States stated that "the lake was
used as a highway and that is the gist of the federal test." 403 U.S. at 11.
43. See United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1934). The Court stated that "upon the admission
of a State to the Union, the title of the United States to lands underlying navigable waters within the
States passes to it, as incident to the transfer to the State of local sovereignty." Id. at 14.
44. See, e.g., Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842). The Martin decision established state
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government holds the beds of navigable waters in trust for future
states until they enter the Union and assume sovereignty on an
equal footing with the established states. 45 Therefore when a new
state was established from the public domain, it acceded to
sovereign ownership of all beds underlying navigable waters. This
sovereign state ownership of the beds extends to the ordinary high
46
watermark.
The ownership of the beds of navigable water bodies issue was
definitely resolved when Congress enacted the Submerged Lands
Act of 1953. 4 7 The Submerged Lands Act confirmed the states' title
48
to the beds of inland navigable waters.
Title to the beds of navigable waters to the ordinary high
watermark passed to the State of North Dakota under the equal
footing doctrine upon its admission into the Union in 1889. 49 By
ownership of beds of navigable tidal waters. Id. at 410. The Court held that tidal and submerged
lands below navigable lakes and streams passed from the British Crown to the original thirteen states
after the American Revolutionary War. Id. The rule in Martin was extended to all states in Pollard's
Lessee v. Hagan under the "equal footing doctrine." Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 230
(1844). A later Supreme Court decision recognized state sovereignty over nontidal navigable waters.
Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876).
45. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1980). See United States v. Mission Rock
Co., 189 U.S. 391, 404 (1903); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 222 (1845). In Pollard's
Lessee the Court addressed the equal footing doctrine as used in the Ordinance of 1787. 44 U.S. at
222. See Northwest Territory and Ordinance Act, ch. VIII, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789). Quoting the
Ordinance the Court stated that "whenever any of the said states shall have sixty thousand free
inhabitants therein, such state shall be admitted by its delegates into the Congress of the United
States, on an equal footing with the original states in all respects whatever." 44 U.S. at 222. The
Court in Mission Rock stated that " [u]pon the admission of California into the Union upon equal
footing with the original States, absolute property in, and dominion and sovereignty over, all soils
under the tidewaters within her limits passed to the State." 189 U.S. at 404.
46. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). In Shively the Court alluded to the reach of
sovereign ownership of the beds by stating that the "new States admitted into the Union since the
adoption of the Constitution have the same rights as the original states in the tide waters, and in the
lands below the high watermark, within their respective jurisdictions." Id. at 26 (emphasis added). The
Court found that its earlier decisions "clearly establish that the title and rights of riparian or littoral
proprietors in the soil below high watermark of navigable waters are governed by the local laws of the
several states, subject of course, to the rights granted to the United States by the Constitution." Id.
at 40 (emphasis added).
47.43 U.S.C. § 1301-1303, 1311-1315 (1976). Section 1311(a) provides:
It is determined and declared to be in the public interest that (1) title to and ownership
of the lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective States,
and the natural resources within such lands and waters, and (2) the right and power to
manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said lands and natural resources all in
accordance with applicable State law be, and they are, subject to the provisions hereof,
recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in and assigned to the respective States
or the persons who were on June 5, 1950, entitled thereto under the law of the
respective States in which the land is located, and the respective grantees, lessees, or
successors, in interest thereof. ...
Id. § 1311(a).
48. See Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973), overruled on other grounds, Oregon v.
Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1976). In Bonelli Cattle Co. the United States Supreme
Court stated that "[the Submerged Lands] Act merely confirmed the state's preexisting rights in the
bed of the waterways within their boundaries by in effect quit claiming all federal claims thereto."
414 U.S. at 318.
49. See State v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271 (8th Cir.), cert. grantedsub nom. Block v. United States, 103
S. Ct. 48 (1982). In Andrus the court stated that "[i]fthe Little Missouri was navigable upon the date
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virtue of common law, 50 the equal footing doctrine, 51 the public
trust doctrine, 52 the Submerged Lands Act, 53 and the Enabling Act
for the State of North Dakota, 54 these lands constitute sovereign
public trust lands of the State of North Dakota. 55 The State
continues to own the beds of navigable waters to the high
watermark in fee subject to a public trust, unless it has conveyed
56
properly these interests consistent with the state constitution.
Title to the beds of nonnavigable waters, however, remained in the

followed
federal government at statehood and
57
lands.
riparian
of
transfers
governmental
C.

subsequent

CONVEYANCES OF SOVEREIGN LANDS-THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE

After a state enters the Union on an equal footing with the
existing states, state law governs title to the beds of navigable
waters. 58 Nevertheless, the control a state may exercise over its
sovereign land grant is unclear because the United States Supreme
Court developed conflicting doctrines. The Court declared that
absent any disposal of these lands by the federal government
prior to statehood,5 9 a state may use or dispose of the bed as it
of North Dakota's admission to the union, then title to the bed of the waterway vested in the State at
that time." 671 F.2d at 276.
50. See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. at 414 (concept that navigable waters and the lands
underneath belong to the public for its common use has existed in England for centuries).
51. See, e.g., Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971) (equal footing doctrine accords newly
admitted states the same property interests in submerged lands enjoyed by the original 13 states).
52. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 459 (1892) (soil under navigable
waters is held by the state in trust for the common use); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota
Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 461 (N.D. 1976) (state holds navigable waters and
the lands beneath them in trust for the public).
53. See 43 U.S.C. 5§ 1301-1303, 1311-1315 (1976).
54. See Dakota Enabling Act, ch. 180, §7, 25 Stat. 676, 679 (1889). The Enabling Act for North
Dakota provides that North Dakota shall be "[a]dmitted into the Union on an Equal Footing with
the Original States." 25 Stat. at 679.
55. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 551 ("[a]fter a State enters the Union, title to the
land is governed by State law").
56. Cf N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (flowing streams and natural water courses shall forever
remain the property of the state).
57. Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508 (1903). In Hardin the Court recognized that the United
States does not own the bed adjacent to lands it owns that are bounded on navigable water and that
title to these beds passed to the state upon admission to the Union. Nevertheless, a conveyance of
land owned by the United States bounded on nonnavigable water will be determined by the law of
the state in which the land lies. Id. at 519.
58. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981). The Court stated that "[a]fter a State
enters the Union, title to the land is governed by state law [subject to] the paramount power of the
United States to ensure that such waters remain free to interstate and foreign commerce." Id.
59. See id. at 544. The Court in Montana v.United States recognized that Congress may sometimes
convey lands below the high watermark of a navigable water by stating:
[Title of a new State may be defeated] in order to perform international obligations, or
to effect the improvement of such lands for the promotion and convenience of
commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, or to carry out other
public purposes appropriate to the objects for which the United States hold the
Territory.
Id. at 551 (quoting Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48 (1894)). Cf United States v. Holt State Bank,
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chooses. 60 This rule is subject to the limitation that prevents
substantial impairment of the public interest in the water and that
requires such waters to remain free for interstate and foreign
61
commerce.
Contrary to the rule that states may use or dispose of the bed
as they desire, the Supreme Court espoused language that limits
and may even prevent states from conveying sovereign lands.
Citing United States v. Oregon62 one student author stated that "[i]n
construing grants by a sovereign to private persons, a court will
observe a presumption against the separation from the sovereign
power of title or dominion to navigable waters and the lands
beneath.'"63 Courts do not favor the conveyance of sovereign land
by states. 64 Therefore, courts usually will interpret such
conveyances quite restrictively and apply a more rigorous standard
65
than is used to analyze conveyances by private persons.
IV.

SECTION 47-01-15
CENTURY CODE

OF

THE

NORTH

DAKOTA

The State of North Dakota entered the Union on an equal
footing with the then existing states in 188966 and acceded to
sovereign ownership of the beds of navigable waters. 67 Upon
270 U.S. 49 (1926). The Holt Court stated that such disposals by the United States during the
territorial period are "not to be lightly inferred, and should not be regarded as intended unless the
intention was definitely declared or otherwise made very plain." Id. at 55. The policy reason for this
rule was that lands under navigable waters in acquired territory were held by the federal government
in trust for the ultimate benefit of future states. Id. Similarly, in Montana v. United States the Court
stated that "[a] court deciding a question of title to the bed of a navigable water must, therefore,
begin with a strong presumption against conveyance by the United States." 450 U.S. at 552.
60. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 54.
61. Id. at 54-55. In Holt the Court noted that the states' control of the beds of navigable waters
was subject "to the paramount power of Congress to control such waters for the purpose of
navigation in commerce among the states and with foreign nations." Id. at 54.
62. 295 U.S. 1 (1934) (a state's dominion over navigable waters is so identified with its
sovereign powers that a presumption exists against their separation from the sovereign).
63. Note, Conveyances of Sovereign Lands Under the Public Trust Doctrine: When Are They in the Public
Interest?,24 U. FLA. L. REv. 285, 289 (1972).
64. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in NaturalResource Law: EffectiveJudicialIntervention, 68 MICH.
L. REv. 471 (1970). Recognizing that states may dispose of trust properties, Professor Sax notes that
"courts do not look kindly upon such grants." Id. at 486.
65. Id. at 486. See People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913). In California
Fish Co. the court recognized that a state, in the exercise of its public trust responsibilities, may sell
tidelands to private use. Id. at 597, 138 P. at 88. Because this sale changes the character of the
property from sovereign to proprietary, the court noted that "statutes purporting to authorize an
abandonment of such public use will be carefully scanned to ascertain whether or not such was the
legislative intention, and that intent must be clearly expressed or necessarily implied." Id. The court
further explained:
It will not be implied if any other inference is reasonably possible. And if any
interpretation of the statute is reasonably possible which would not involve a
destruction of the public use or an intention to terminate it in violation of the trust, the
courts will give the statute such interpretation.
Id.

66. Dakota Enabling Act, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676, 679 (1889).
67. State v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271, 276-77 (8th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Block v. State, 103 S.
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statehood the laws of the Dakota Territory became those of the new
state. 68 One provision that remains a part of the North Dakota
Century Code is section 266 of the Dakota Civil Code. 69 Section
266 provided as follows:
Except where the grant under which the land is held
indicates a different intent, the owner of the upland, when
it borders upon a navigable lake or stream, takes to the
edge of the lake or stream at low-water mark, and all
navigable rivers shall remain and be deemed public
highways. 70
After statehood North Dakota desired to adapt the laws then in
force to its constitution and to harmonize the statutes enacted since
the revision of 1877.71 Chapter 82 of the laws of 189172 provided for
a commission to revise the codes, but a protracted senatorial
73
election prevented the enactment of the commission's product.
Another commission was appointed in 1893 and its efforts became
the Revised Code of 1895. 74 Section 266 of the Dakota Civil Code
was retained as section 3373 of the North Dakota Revised Code of
1895 with only insignificant changes. 75 Section 3373 was again
revised in 1943.76 The provision presently exists as section 47-01-15
Ct. 48 (1982).
68. North Dakota Constitution, schedule, 1890 N.D. Sess. Laws 54, repealed by North Dakota
Constitution art. amend. 100, ch. 691, 5 1, 1979 N.D. Sess. Laws 1726. Section 2 of the schedule
implementing the transition from a territory to statehood provided: "All laws now in force in the
territory of Dakota, which are not repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain in force until they

expire by theii own limitations or be altered or repealed." North Dakota Constitution, schedule, § 2.
69. See TERR. DAK. Civ. CODE 5 266 (1877) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE 5 47-01-15 (1978)).
70. TERR. DAK. CIv. CODE § 266 (1877). Section 266 exists today in almost identical form under
5 47-01-15 of the North Dakota Century Code. Section 47-01-15 provides:
Except when the grant under which the land is held indicates a different intent, the
owner of the upland, when it borders on a navigable lake or stream, takes to the edge
of the lake or stream at low watermark. All navigable rivers shall remain and be

deemed public highways. In all cases when the opposite banks of any stream not
navigable belong to different persons, the stream and the bed thereof shall become
common to both.
N.D. CENT. CODE 5 47-01-15 (1978).
71. Corbet, Newton & Amidon, Preface to NORTH DAKOTA REVISED CODE at vi (1895)
[hereinafter cited as Corbet]. The Dakota Territory was a Field Code jurisdiction. Id. at v. The codes
used in the territory "were taken either from those prepared by the New York commissioners, or
from other states in which codes based on the work of the New York commissioners, had been
adopted." Id.
72. See Act to Provide for the Compilation of the Laws of North Dakota, ch. 82, § 1, 1891 N.D.
Sess. Laws 224.
73. Corbet, supra note 71, at vi.
74. Act of Mar. 1, 1883, ch. 74, § 1, 1893 N.D. Sess. Laws 184.
75. See N.D. REVISED CODE § 3373 (1895).
76. See N.D. REVISED CODE 5 47-0115 (1943) (currently codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15
(1978)). The major change in the 1943 revision was the addition of "Boundary of ownership" to the
"Banks and beds of streams" language in the headnotes. The reviser's notes state that the headnotes
were "[r]evised for clarity without change in meaning." See CODE REVISION CONIMI'N, CODE
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of the North Dakota Century Code." Section 47-01-15 provides
that "[e]xcept when the grant under which the land is held
indicates a different intent, the owner of the upland, when it
borders on a navigable lake or stream, takes to the edge of the lake
or stream at low watermark." 78
Section 47-01-15 of the North Dakota Century Code purports
to convey to riparian landowners an interest in that part of the bed
of navigable waters between the high and low watermarks. 79 In
80
light of common law, the equal footing and public trust doctrines,
and state constitutional provisions, however, the right or privilege
granted by the statute cannot be a property interest.
A.

NORTH

DAKOTA

SECTION

47-01-15

SUPREME

COURT

INTERPRETATIONS

OF

The North Dakota Supreme Court has never interpreted
directly section 47-01-15 or determined whether it comports with
the North Dakota Constitution. The court has alluded to the statute
to determine other issues, but has not interpreted the statute by
applying the concepts affecting the ownership of sovereign lands.
The primary reason that the court has never addressed directly the
ownership problem is that the State has consistently failed to raise
the issue. 81 Nevertheless, by failing to resolve the ownership issue
both the court and the State may be violating their duty to protect
82
the public interests.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has given section 47-01-15
a literal interpretation. The court has consistently assumed that the
REVISION REPORT COVERING WORK OF THE CODE REVISION COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE 28TH SESS.
OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY § 47-0115 reviser's note (1944).
77. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15 (1978).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. The public trust doctrine has been recognized to impose "a trust in favor of public rights
and uses on publicly-owned navigable waters and their underlying beds, including submerged ...
tidelands and shorelands. 14. ALTHAUS, PUBLIC TRUST RIGHTS 420 (1978). Such public trust lands are
... either considered inalienable, or if conveyed to private ownership, still subject to the trust." Id.
See also Note, The Public Trust Doctrine in North Dakota, 54 N.D.L. REV. 565, 565 (1978) (public trust
doctrine "allows the public, as beneficiaries, 'to protect its interests when the state exceeds
restrictions imposed upon it by a trusteeship of property dedicated to the benefit of the public").
81. See Hazelton-Moffit Special School Dist. v. Ward, 107 N.W.2d 636 (N.D. 1961). The North
Dakota Supreme Court stated that it "will not pass upon a constitutional question, except when such
question is properly before it and necessarily involved." Id. at 646. It follows that if the State were to
raise the issue, the supreme court would pass upon the constitutionality of § 47-01-15.
82. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Nagle, 190 N.W.2d 758 (N.D. 1971); LePire v. Workmen's
Compensation Bureau, I11 N.W.2d 355 (N.D. 1961). The court in Nagle discussed the Attorney
General's failure to file an undertaking on appeal and stated that "if the attorney for the State fails to
protect the rights and interests of the State in any litigation, and this failure becomes apparent to the
court, the court should see that the public interests are protected." 190 N.W.2d at 763. The court in
LePire stated that when "counsel for the State fails to protect the State's interests." the court is not
powerless to protect the interests ofthe public. 111 N.W.2d at 359.
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statute gives riparians who own land adjacent to navigable waters
title in fee to the ordinary low watermark. 83 Because the State has
not pleaded the issue, the court has not been required to determine
the constitutionality of interpreting section 47-01-15 as a grant of
fee title.
For years commentators quietly have suspected that the
court's interpretation of section 47-01-15 is invalid. 84 Arguably, the
State lacks the requisite authority to give the beds of navigable
water bodies between the high and low watermarks to riparians
adjacent to the bed.85 The argument is premised on the fact that
North Dakota acceded to ownership of the beds of navigable lakes
and streams as an incident of sovereignty upon statehood.8 6 Section
47-01-15, however, provides that riparian landowners whose lands
border on a navigable lake or stream take to the edge of the lake or
stream at low watermark. 7 Because the North Dakota Supreme
Court interpreted the statute to mean that riparian landowners own
to the low watermark,8 8 section 47-01-15 would act as a transfer of a
portion of North Dakota's sovereign public trust land grant. The
North Dakota Supreme Court has not determined, however,
whether the State of North Dakota has the authority to give
sovereign public trust lands to private landowners. 89 Any analysis
83. See Hogue v. Bourgois, 71 N.W.2d 47, 52 (N.D. 1955) (court assumes that the owner o-f
lands riparian to a navigable stream owns title to the low watermark); State v. Loy, 74 N.D. 182, 20
N.W.2d 668 (1945) (State of North Dakota recognizes that the boundaries of lands extend to ihe low
watermark).

84. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 19 (query whether North Dakota can give away any land it owns).
85. See N.D. CONST. art. X, § 18. For the text of § 18, see infra note 89.
86. State v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271, 273 (8th Cir.), cert. grantedsub nom. Block v. State, 103 S. Ct.
48(1982).
87. N.D. CENT. CODE §47-01-15 (1978).
88. See, e.g., Hogue v. Bourgois, 71 N.W.2d at 52.
89. See generally Beck, supra note 19. In his article on boundary litigation, Professor Robert E.
Beck recognized that a "state is free to give up its title to private owners" and that "many states have
done so." Beck, supra note 19, at 436-37. Professor Beck, however, questioned whether "North
Dakota can give away any land it owns." Beck, supra note 19, at 437 n.50. In so stating, Beck does
not seem to be questioning the general rule, but only North Dakota's ability to give away land in
light of its unique set of circumstances.
The issue of the State giving property it owns to private landowners is analogous to the
challenged "reconveyance" clause in chapter 212, § 2 of the 1953 North Dakota Session Laws. See
Beck, supra note 19, at 460-61. Section 2 provided for the "reconveying" of mineral rights to the
original owners or their successors. See Reconveyance of Property Unlawfully Taken for Highway
Purposes, ch. 212, § 2, 1953 N.D. Sess. Laws 335 (1953) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-03.2
(1976)). Beck suggests that such action would be in violation of article I, § 20 and article X, § 18 of
the North Dakota Constitution. Beck, supra note 19, at 461 n.164.
See N.D. CONST. art. I, § 20. This section provides: "No special privileges or immunities shall
ever be granted which may not be altered, revoked or repealed by the legislative assembly; nor shall
any citizen or class of citizens be granted privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall
not be granted to all citizens." Id.
See id. art. X, § 18. This section provides:
The state, any county or city may make internal improvements and may engage in
any industry, enterprise or business, not prohibited by article XX of the constitution,
but neither the state nor any political subdivision thereof shall otherwise loan or give
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of authority to convey public trust land must involve a discussion of
territorial precedent to determine whether the Legislative Assembly
of Dakota Territory had authority to enact legislation allowing
riparian or littoral owners to take to the low watermark on
navigable waters.
B.

TERRITORIAL PRECEDENT

Section 47-01-15 of the North Dakota Century Code existed
prior to statehood as part of the laws of the Dakota Territory.9"
When North Dakota became a state in 1889 it acceded to the laws
of the Dakota Territory that were not repugnant to the North
Dakota Constitution. 9 1 Section 47-01-15 was reenacted when North
Dakota revised its civil code in 1895 to conform to the needs of the
new state, and the provision has been retained in its original
form. 92 Because section 47-01-15 was first enacted when North
Dakota was a part of the Dakota Territory and the revisers of 1895
found no need to revise the provisions, the statute must be
interpreted in light of its territorial origin. 93 Arguably, section 4701-15 must have the same effect today as it did when first enacted
by the Dakota Legislative Assembly.
The beds of navigable waters within the Dakota Territory
94
were held by the United States in trust for the future state.
its credit or make donations to or in aid of any individual, association or corporation
except for reasonable support of the poor, nor subscribe to or become the owner of
capital stock in any association or corporation.
Id. Professor Beck questions the authority of the State to give away land that it owns, but did not
directly address the issue. Beck, supra note 19, at 437 n.50. His challenge to the validity of S 47-01-15
is apparent, however, by his reference to Solberg v. State. Beck, supra note 19, at 461 n. 164. See Solberg
v. State, 78 N.D. 806, 53 N.W.2d 49 (1952). The court in Solberg ruled that a statute that released
mineral reservations held by the state to private persons violated article X, § 18 because it was a
donation "to or in aid of an individual." 78 N.D. at 816-17, 53 N.W.2d at 54-55.
90. See TERR. DAK. CIv. CODE § 266 (1877) (currently codified at N.D. CENT. CODE 5 47-01-15
(1978)). The source notes after the statute state that § 47-01-15 was derived from § 830 of the
California Civil Code. The California Civil Code originated in the uncompleted work of the
commission appointed by the State of New York. The New York commission's undertaking was not
enacted in that state, but was enacted in part by the Dakota Legislative Assembly in 1866.
Subsequently, the code was revised, amended, and enacted by California in 1873. In 1877 the civil
code was enlarged and re-en~cted by Dakota. Old § 266, presently codified at § 47-01-15, was an
addition to the code, the source of which was the California version of the code. See Hand, Preface to
DAKOTA REVISED CODE at iv (1877).
91. See North Dakota Constitution, schedule, § 2, 1890 N.D. Sess. Laws 54, repealed by North
Dakota Constitution art. amend. 100, ch. 691, § 1, 1979 N.D. Sess. Laws 1726.
92. N.D. REVISED CODE § 3373 (1895) (currently codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15
(1978)).
93. See Corbet, supra note 71, at vi. After North Dakota became a state, the legislature
recognized a need "to adapt the laws then in force to the constitution of the State and to harmonize
the large body of statutes which had been passed since the revision of 1877." Corbet, supra note 71,
at vi. Because the resulting Revised Code of 1895 made no changes in the present § 47-01-15, it can
be inferred that the drafters found the territorial version of the statute equally applicable to the State.
94. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981) (federal government holds such
lands in trust for future states); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1893) (when the United States
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Therefore, the Territorial Legislative Assembly had no authority to
confer on or vest in riparian landowners any title, interest, or estate
in the beds of navigable waters.9 5 As a result, the code revisers and
the Territorial Legislative Assembly, which approved the Revised
Code of 1877, could not have intended section 47-01-1596 as a grant
in fee of a portion of the beds.9 7 Because the beds were held in trust
for the future state by the federal government, an interpretation to
the contrary would violate the equal footing doctrine. If either title
to or jurisdiction over the beds of navigable waters could be
conveyed by territorial legislative assemblies to riparians, new
states would enter the Union on less than an equal footing with the
original states. 98
The Dakota government had no authority to confer upon
riparians title to the beds of navigable water to the low
watermark.99 The Territorial Legislative Assembly did not
acquired a territory, title and dominion passed to the United States "for the benefit of the whole
people, and in trust for the several States to be ultimately created out of the territory").
95. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894);
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845). The Court in Pollard'sLessee recognized that only the
states ultimately formed out of the territories have authority to transfer title in sovereign beds to
private persons. 44 U.S. at 230. The Court in Shively ruled that the territorial government may not
transfer rights in the beds of navigable waters. 152 U.S. at 58. The Shlivey Court recognized,
however, that the United States, because it has all the powers of both national and municipal
government, may grant title or rights in soils below the high watermark of tide water for appropriate
purposes. Id. Yet the Shively Court pointed out that the United States had never so acted; rather, the
United States had left "the administration and disposition of the sovereign rights in navigable
waters, and in the soils under them, to the control of the States, respectively, when organized and
admitted into the Union." Id. The Court in Montana v. United States stated that there was a strong
presumption against a conveyance by the United States. 450 U.S. at 552.
96. See TERR. DAK. CsV. CODE § 266 (1877) (currently codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15
(1978)).
97. See generally Vogel, Looking Back on a Centuyy of Complete Codificationof the Law, 53 N.D.L. REv.
225 (1976). Codification of the substantive law was an attempt to avoid what the revisers considered
the political evils of the judge made common law. Id. at 228-29. The resulting codes were attractive
to the legislators of Dakota Territory because "they needed laws at once, and the Field Codes were
available in handy form." Id. at 228. In interpreting provisions from the Field Codes, such as § 4701-15, the courts must apply the common law when the code is silent. Id. at 232.
At common law, title to the beds ofnavigable waters was held by the sovereign. Shively, 152 U.S.
at 11. This title extended to the ordinary high watermark. Id. Therefore, unless the legislative intent
of the statute was changed after statehood, § 47-01-15 could not have been intended as a grant to
riparians of the beds between the high and low watermarks. If the statute was an authorization by the
Territorial Legislative Assembly for upland owners to take the beds then held by the United States
for the future state, the statute would be void ab initio. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at
551.
98. See Engdahl, Federalism and Energy, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARiz. L.
Rev. 283 (1976). The United States Supreme Court in Mayor of New Orleans v. United States
andPollard'sLessee gave two reasons for the rule that automatically divests the United States of both
title and jurisdiction in the beds of navigable waters at statehood. Id. at 294. See Pollard's Lessee v.
Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845); Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. 662 (1836). "First,
there was a strong commitment to the principle that new states must be admitted to the Union on an
equal footing with the original states." Engdahl, supra, at 294. Second, "[t]he Court reasoned that
the federal government lacked constitutional power to exercise general government jurisdiction over
any territory within the boundaries of a state other than those places specified in the article I property
clause." Id.
99. SeeAct of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. LXXXVI, § 6, 12 Stat. 241. Section 6 provides that "no law
shall be passed [by the Territorial Legislative Assembly] interfering with the primary disposal of the
soil." Id. This language is similar to article IV of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which declared
that territorial legislatures could not interfere with the federal government's disposal of the public
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understand that the statute it borrowed from California, although
appropriate for a state, did not apply to the territorial situation.
Therefore, to fully understand the validity of section 47-01-15 in a
territorial setting, California's counterpart to the statute must be
analyzed.
C.

THE CALIFORNIA PRECEDENT

Section 47-01-15 of the North Dakota Century Code was
derived almost verbatim from the California Civil Code.100
California also acceded to sovereignty over the beds of nontidal
navigable lakes and streams to the ordinary high watermark as an
incident of statehood. 101 The State of California holds these lands in
trust for the benefit of the public. 10 2 In determining the State's
interest in the beds of navigable waters, the California Supreme
Court interpreted section 830,103 the California counterpart of
section 47-01-15,104 as giving riparians title in fee to the low
watermark.10 5 The beds between the high and low watermarks,
although owned by the riparians, are nevertheless subject to a trust
lands. See Northwest Territory and Ordinance Act, ch. VIII, 1 Stat. 50, 52 n.(a) (1789).
100. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 830 (1872) (currently codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 830 (West 1982)).
Section 830 provides:
Except where the grant under which the land is held indicates a different intent, the
owner of the upland, when it borders on tidewater, takes to ordinary high watermark;
when it borders upon a navigable lake or stream, where there is no tide, the owner
takes to the edge of the lake or stream, at low watermark; when it borders upon any
other water, the owner takes to the middle of the lake or stream.
Id. Section 830 was part of the California Revised Code of 1872, which was based on the
uncompleted Field Code of New York. Much of the California code was borrowed by Dakota
Territory in the Revised Code of 1877. Hand, Preface to DAKOTA REvIsED CODE at iv (1877).
101. State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 223, 625 P.2d 239, 246, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, 703,
cert. denjedsub nom. Tahoe Shorezone Representation v. California, 454 U.S. 865 (1981).
102. Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 522, 606 P.2d 362, 365, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327,
330, cert. denied sub nom. Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. Berkeley, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); see
People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913) (grantees own the soil subject to the
public easement for navigation and commerce).
103. See CAL. CIV. CODE §830 (West 1982).
104. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15 (1978).
105. See Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d at 226, 625 P.2d at 248, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 705. In ruling that
§ 830 acted as a conveyance of the beds to the low watermark, the court noted "that two states
[Montana and North Dakota], which adopted a statute similar to section 830 as part of the Field
Code, interpret their enactments as conveying title to riparian owners to the low watermark in
navigable nontidal rivers." Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15; Hogue v. Bourgois, 71 N.W.2d
47, 52 (N.D. 1955)).
The California court relied on Hogue v. Bourgois in which the North Dakota Supreme Court cited
5 47-01-15 of the North Dakota Century Code for a proposition unrelated to the ownership of the
beds of navigable waters. 71 N.W.2d at 52. The North Dakota court did state, however, that "the
owner of lands riparian to a navigable stream owns title to the low watermark." Id. (citing State v.
Loy, 74 N.D. 182, 20 N.W.2d 668 (1945); Gardner v. Green, 67 N.D. 268, 271 N.W. 775 (1937)).
The court did not cite § 47-01-15 for this proposition. Rather, the North Dakota court intended the
language as a corollary to the rule that "[tjhe title of the State of North Dakota to lands below low
watermark of a navigable stream is coextensive with the bed of the stream as it may exist from time to
time." Id.
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for the benefit of the public. 106
Although the statutes are technically identical, the California
Supreme Court's interpretation of section 830 is of little value in
interpreting section 47-01-15 in the North Dakota setting. 10 7 The
California court relied heavily upon administrative interpretations
in finding that section 830 extended riparian ownership on
navigable waters to the low watermark. 108 In State v. Superior Court0 9
evidence demonstrated that prior to 1970 state authorities,
including the Attorney General, consistently claimed state
ownership only to the low watermark by virtue of section 830.110
Between 1970 and 1977 the California Attorney General reversed
his position and claimed state ownership to the high watermark. I'
Similar to the California administrative agencies, North
Dakota's Attorneys General have not consistently interpreted
section 47-01-15.112 During the early years of the State's history,
North Dakota's elected officials often failed to protect the State's
interest in its sovereign public trust land grant."13 In the past
quarter century, however, North Dakota has experienced a
renewed awareness of the State's interests in its sovereign lands and
the corresponding public trust responsibilities inherent in their
ownership." 4 The North Dakota Attorney General has shown the
greatest awareness of the State's sovereign interest in the beds of
106. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d at 210, 625 P.2d at 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 696. The court found
that the state holds the trust lands for the benefit of the public and, therefore, any conveyance of title
to private persons does not necessarily free the property from the burden of the public trust. Id. at
227, 625 P.2d at 248, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 705. Rather, unless the conveyance is for the purpose of
promoting trust goals, the grantee takes title subject to the rights of the public. Id. Therefore,
riparians may utilize the beds in any manner consistent with the public's interest in the property. Id.
at 232, 625 P.2d at 252, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 709. This public interest includes commerce, navigation,
fishing, recreation, and the right to preserve the tidelands in their natural state. Id. at 230, 625 P.2d
at 251, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
107. Various factors preclude an interpretation of § 47-01-15 similar to that of § 830 of the
California Civil Code. A major factor is that California does not have a constitutional provision
analogous to article 10, § 18, of the North Dakota Constitution. Article 10, § 18 precludes the State
of North Dakota from giving away property it owns. See Solberg v. State, 78 N.D. 806, 814, 53
N.W.2d 49, 53-54 (1952).
108. See 29 Cal. 3d at 210, 625 P.2d at 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 696. The court stated that "[i]f the
decisional law is ambiguous regarding whether section 830 constitutes a grant or a rule for the
construction of deeds, the same cannot be said of the administrative interpretation of the provision."
Id. at 225, 625 P.2d at 247, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
109. 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, cert. denied sub nom. Tahoe Shorezone
Representation v. California, 454 U.S. 865 (1981).
110. State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 225, 625 P.2d 239, 247, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, 704,
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981).
111. 29 Cal. 3d at 24-25, 65 P.2d at 247, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 704-05.
112. Compare 1964-1966 Op. Att'y Gen. 459 (1965) (North Dakota would continue to maintain
the position that the State owns the beds to the ordinary high watermark) with 1964-1966 Op. Att'y
Gen. 473 (1966) (Attorney General states the possibility that owners of land along Sweetwater Lake
could prove "they hold title to the ordinary low watermark").
113. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
114. See United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d
457, 461 (N.D. 1976) (State holds the navigable waters and the lands beneath them in trust for the
public).
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navigable waters. 115 Since Rutten v. State11 6 the North Dakota
Attorney General, in representing the State in litigation, has
claimed that the beds of navigable waters between the high and low
watermarks are sovereign public trust lands of the State. 117
Therefore, the Attorney General argues, the State owns the land to
the high watermark on all navigable waters. I 8
The State of North Dakota defended the quiet title action in
Rutten by asserting ownership of Devils Lake to 1425 feet above sea
level, which the State contended was the ordinary high
watermark. 1 9 The State implied that even if the riparian owner
could successfully claim title to the ordinary low watermark, such
title is absolute only to the ordinary high watermark. 20 The State
contended that the intervening area between the low watermark
and high watermark is subject to a public right for public purposes,
particularly purposes in connection with the use of a navigable
lake. ' 2' Rutten claimed that the ordinary high watermark of Devils
Lake was 1419 feet above mean sea level and the title to the land
vested in him by the process of reliction.1 22
The Rutten case was presented to the North Dakota Supreme
Court on stipulation.123 The court held that plaintiff Rutten failed
to sustain his burden of proof that the waters of Devils Lake
"permanently" receded. 124 The court also held that the State failed
to prove the existence of an ordinary high water level of Devils Lake
in excess of 1419 feet above mean sea level. 25 Because Rutten
126
failed to sustain his burden of proof the action was dismissed.
115. See, e.g., State v. Andrus, 506 F. Supp. at 621.
116. 93 N.W.2d 796 (N.D. 1958) (owner of land bordering Devils Lake brought an action to
enjoin the State of North Dakota from artificially raising the level of the lake as authorized by the
Garrison Diversion Unit).
117. See Rutten v. State, 93 N.W.2d 796, 797 (N.D. 1958).
118. See 1964-1966 Op. Att'y Gen. 459, 461 (1965).
119. Rutten, 93 N.W.2d at 798.
120. Id. at 797.
121. Id. The Rutten court relied upon the South Dakota Supreme Court decision in Anderson v.
Ray. Rutten, 93 N.W.2d at 799. See Anderson v. Ray, 37 S.D. 17, 156 N.W. 591 (1916) (State of
South Dakota may raise the level of lakes to the ordinary high watermark). See also Flisrand v.
Madson, 35 S.D. 457, 152 N.W. 796 (1915) (although the title of the riparian owner on navigable

waters extends to ordinary low watermark, his title is still not absolute).
122. Rutten, 93 N.W.2d at 796-97. Reliction has been defined as "land added to a tract fronting
upon the waters of a lake, pond, or stream by the permanent uncovering of the land." Flisrand v.
Madson, 35 S.D. at 463, 152 N.W. at 798. See also Roberts v. Taylor, 47 N.D. 146, 156, 181 N.W.
622, 626-27 (1921) (riparians are "entitled to receive those additions . . . to riparian land which
accumulates through processes ofaccretion or reliction").
123. Rutten, 93 N.W.2d at 797-98. The stipulation of facts consisted of a geographical and
historical analysis of Devils Lake, including evidence of the navigable nature of the lake at statehood.
Id.
124. Id. at 798-99. The court stated that "[t]he evidence before the court fails to warrant the
conclusion that there has been a permanent reliction to the present level of the lake or that the waters
in the lake will never again reach some higher level." Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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Therefore, the merits of the case were not decided.
In 1965 Attorney General Helgi Johanneson once again
clarified North Dakota's position on the issue of State ownership of
the bed of Devils Lake. 12 7 Attorney General Johanneson opined
that the State of North Dakota would maintain its Rutten position
and continue to claim title to the bed of Devils Lake to the high
watermark.

128

No authority, however, was cited in the Attorney

General opinion to support this proposition. Nevertheless, the State
was required to claim title to the high watermark if the proposed
Devils Lake restoration was to be a reality. 1 29 The Attorney
General was either aware of the State's interest in the beds of
navigable waters to the ordinary high watermark or merely took
this position out of expediency. 130
One year after the Devils Lake Attorney General opinion, the
Attorney General's office again confronted the issue of the extent of
the State's ownership of the beds. 131 In aJanuary 26, 1966, opinion
the Attorney General was presented with the following issue: "Will
the [Sweetwater-Dry Lake] Water Management District be
required to compensate the owners of riparian land in and around
Sweetwater Lake, for the lake bottom land below meander
line . . . ?,,132 The lake was to be flooded by a proposed canal
draining into the lake. 133 Although Sweetwater Lake is a navigable
127. 1964-1966 Op. Att'y Gen. 459 (1965). Attorney GeneralJohanneson stated:
[I]t is our opinion that the State of North Dakota would continue to maintain the
position it took in the Rutten case or possibly claim that the high watermark was
higher, somewhat in the area ofbetween 1425 and the meander line of 1437. The land
involved would still be claimed as belonging to the State.
Id. at 461.
128. Id. at 461. A district court has held that Devils Lake is navigable in fact. 101 Ranch v.
United States, No. A2-81-89 (D.N.D. Dec. 21, 1981) (order granting first partial summary
judgment motion). Therefore, the State's position on Devils Lake appears equally applicable to all
navigable lakes within the state.
129. Rutten, 93 N.W.2d at 797.
130. Cf 1964-1966 Op. Att'y Gen. 459 (1965). The simplest argument to support the State's
authorization for artificially filling the lake under the Garrison Diversion Unit would have been that
the State of North Dakota owned the bed of Devils Lake to the high watepmark. In his 1965 opinion,
the North Dakota Attorney General maintained that even if riparians owned to the low watermark,
such title was not absolute but subject to a public trust for public purposes. Id. at 460. This public
trust theory, the Attorney General argued, entitled the State to raise the level of the lake to the high
watermark without compensating affected riparians. Id. at 460-61. See also Anderson v. Ray, 37 S.D.
17, 156 N.W. 591 (1916). In Anderson the South Dakota Supreme Court confronted similar state
ownership issues. Anderson involved whether the State had authority to artificially raise the water of
, 156 N.W. at 594. The purpose of the
Red Lake by constructing artesian wells. Id. at construction was to maintain a sufficient quantity of water in Red Lake for recreational use. Id. at
-,
156. N.W. at 592. Riparians, whose privately owned farmland between the high and low
watermarks would be inundated by the raising of the level of the lake, brought suit to enjoin
construction. Id. The South Dakota Supreme Court ruled that the State could fill the lake to the
ordinary high watermark, even to the detriment of riparian landowners, because title to such land
was "subject to the superior right of the public." Id. at -, 156 N.W. at 594-95.
131. 1964-1966 Op. Att'y Gen. 473 (1966).
132. Id. at 474.
133. Id. at 473-75.
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lake, 134 the Attorney General did not assert that the State had
authority to flood the lake to high watermark because of the State's
ownership of the bed. 135 Instead he concluded that section 61-15-02
of the North Dakota Century Code authorized the State to use the
bed. 136 Therefore, under the State's police power the Water
Management District was not required to compensate the owners
of riparian land around Sweetwater Lake for the flooded bottom
land below the meander line. 137 This opinion, however, is
inconsistent with the State's position in Rutten and the Attorney
General opinion of the previous year. 138 Although the Sweetwater
Lake opinion does not specifically recognize riparian ownership of
the bed of Sweetwater Lake, the opinion does not contest the
riparian claims of ownership to the low watermark. 139
In sum, the North Dakota Supreme Court has provided little
guidance in interpreting section 47-01-15. The court merely
assumes a literal interpretation of the statute and provides no
authority supporting its decision. 140 Likewise, North Dakota
Attorney General opinions have not been consistent and have
provided little authority when asserting the State's position on the
ownership issue. Therefore, these opinions cannot be relied upon in
interpreting section 47-01-15. The California Supreme Court
relied on administrative opinions in determining that California's
134. Roberts v. Taylor, 47 N.D. 146, 154, 181 N.W. 622, 626 (1921). The North Dakota
Supreme Court in Taylor found that Sweetwater Lake "has been used for hunting and for boating by
the public" and that it is "a large permanent body of water." Id. at 154-55, 181 N.W. at 626. The
court then declared the waters of Sweetwater Lake to be "navigable in character." Id.
The United States Supreme Court initially allowed state courts to determine which beds passed
to the states upon admission to the Union. See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1894). The
Court, however, later held that the federal definition of navigability determined which beds passed to
the states upon admission to the Union. See United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931); United
States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1926).
135. 1964-1966 Op. Att'y Gen. 473, 475-76 (1966).
136. Id. at 475. See N.D. CENT. CODE §61-15-02 (1960). Section 61-15-02 provides:
By virtue of its police power the state shall be vested with the control of navigable lakes
which have been meandered and their metes and bounds established by the
government of the United States in the survey of public lands, within the ordinary
high-water mark for the purpose of constructing, maintaining and operating . . .
structures to promote the conservation, development, storage, distribution, and
utilization of such water and the propagation and preservation ofwildlife.
Id.
137. See 1964-1966 Op. Att'y Gen. 473, 477 (1966).
138. See Rutten v. State, 93 N.W.2d 796 (N.D. 1958); 1964-1966 Op. Att'y Gen. 459 (1965).
139. See 1964-1966 Op. Att'y Gen. 459, 476-77 (1966). Although the Attorney General does not
argue that the State owns the bed by reason of navigability, he states that "assum[ing] the owners of
the land surrounding Sweetwater Lake can prove, within the standard prescribed in the Rutten case
. . . that they hold title to the ordinary low watermark, the intervening area between the low
watermark and high watermark is subject to a public right." Id. The opinion is unclear about
whether the Attorney General believes the State or the riparians own the beds. See id.
140. See Hogue v. Bourgois, 71 N.W.2d 47, 52 (N.D. 1955) (riparians own title to the low
watermark).
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counterpart to section 47-01-15141 gives riparians title to the low
watermark. 142 Yet, the North Dakota situation is different because
of its territorial precedent. Whereas it was proper for an existing
state, such as California, to enact legislation conveying a portion of
its public trust land grant, 143 territories do not possess the requisite
144
authority to enact such legislation.
Section 47-01-15 is void ab initio if the provision violates the
North Dakota Constitution. 145 Therefore, the statute must be
analyzed in light of section 185 of the North Dakota Constitution.
V.

SECTION 185
STITUTION

OF

THE

NORTH

DAKOTA

CON-

After North Dakota entered the United States in 1889, state
law governed title to the beds of navigable waters. 146 The State in
its sovereign capacity may convey an interest in the beds of
navigable waters. 147 This conveyance, however, is subject to the
presumption against separation of states from title to the beds of
navigable waters 148 and to the restrictive construction of grants
conveying sovereign lands. 149 In North Dakota this rule is also
limited by state constitutional provisions.150 Article 10, section 18
141. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 830 (West 1982).
142. See, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 224, 625 P.2d 239, 246, 172 Cal. Rptr.
696, 704 (1981) (cites five Attorney General Opinions).
143. See United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1926).
144. Id. at 55 (United States has sole dominion over the lands under navigable waters that it
holds for the benefit of future states). The California line of cases is of little value in interpreting § 4701-15 because the North Dakota provision should be interpreted in light of its adoption as § 266 of
the Dakota Revised Code of 1877. At the time § 266 was adopted, beds of navigable waters were held
in trust by the United States until such time as North Dakota became a state. See Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981) (federal government holds land under navigable waters in trust for
future states). Therefore, the Legislative Assembly of Dakota Territory had no authority to enact
legislation allowing riparians to take to the low watermark of navigable waters. The California
provision was enacted after statehood when the state acceded to ownership of the beds. State v.
Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d at 223, 625 P.2d at 246, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 703. Thus, any conveyance by
California through § 830 took place following California's entry into the Union.
145. See Cumberland Capital Corp. v. Patty, 556 S.W.2d 516, 538 (Tenn. 1977).
146. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981) (title to the land is governed by
state law after a state enters the Union); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1894) (title and rights
of riparian proprietors in the soil below the high watermark are governed by state law, subject to the
ights granted to the United States by the Constitution).
147. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54 (1926).
148. See Note, Conveyances of Sovereign Lands Under the Public Trust Doctrine: When Are They in the
Public Interest?, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 285, 289 (1972). Although no general prohibition against the
disposition of trust properties exists, many courts have been hostile to such grants. See supra notes 6364 and accompanying text.
149. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, 68 MicH. L. REV. 471, 486 (1970).
Professor Sax states that because a state has an obligation as trustee, which it may not lawfully
divest, whatever title the grantee takes is impressed with the public trust and the title must be read to
conform to that trust. Id. at 486-87.
150. See N.D. CONST. art. X, 5 18 (1889, amended 1914, 1918). Section 18 provides:
The state, any county or city may make internal improvements and may engage in
any industry, enterprise or business, not prohibited by article XX of the constitution,
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of the North Dakota Constitution limits the State's ability to
convey the beds of navigable waters.

Delegates to the North Dakota Constitutional Convention of
1889 apparently chose to protect state property from those in a
position to improperly give or lend state property to private

citizens.1 51 The convention constitutionalized this desire by
enacting article 12, section 185 of the North Dakota Constitution
(section 185). 152

There is little legislative history

of the constitutional

provision 153 and its South Dakota 54 and Montana 5 5 counterparts.
The annotations to article 13, section 1, of the original Montana

Constitution give some indication of the framers' intent in enacting
the provision.15

6

The framers

of the Montana Constitution

but neither the state nor any political subdivision thereof shall otherwise loan or give
its credit or make donations to or in aid of any individual, association or corporation
except for reasonable support of the poor, nor subscribe to or become the owner of
capital stock in any association or corporation.
Id. Accord N.D. CONST. art. IX, 5 9 (1981). Just as article X, § 18 prohibits the state from giving
away property it owns, article IX, § 9 prohibits private individuals from claiming state public lands
based on adverse possession. See N.D. CoNsT. art. X, § 18. For the text of article IX, § 9, see supra
note 25.
151. See OFFICIAL REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE FIRST CONSTI1UTIONAL

CONVENTION OF NORTH DAKOTA,JULY 4 TO AuGusT 17, 1889, at 437-38. Cf. MONT. CONsT. art. XIII,
§ 1 annot. (1889, repealed 1972). Article 13, 5 1 of the original Montana Constitution is almost
identical to article 10, § 18 of the North Dakota Constitution. See MONT. CONsT. art. XIII, § 1 (1889,
repealed by omission 1972); N.D. CONT. art. X, § 18. Montana entered the Union in 1889, the
same year North Dakota became a state. See Dakota Enabling Act, ch. 180, § 8, 25 Stat. 676, 679
(1889). Annotations to the North Dakota provision provide no guidance in determining the intent of
the framers, but the annotations to its Montana counterpart are useful. The annotations to article 13,
§ 1 of the Montana Constitution state that the provision was intended to prevent the "evils" of
extending state aid to the railroads. MONT. CONsT. art. XIII, § 1 annot. (1889, repealed 1972).
Presumably such aid was in the form of land grants because the new state had little else of value
within its control. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (state's title to the bed is
held in trust for the people of the state and cannot be lost by a conveyance of the property).
152. See N.D. CONT. art. XII, § 185 (1960) (renumbered art. X, § 18 (1981)). Section 185
presently exists as article 10, § 18 of the North Dakota Constitution. This provision is commonly
referred to by commentators as section 185.
153. See OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE FIRST CONSTITtrIONAI.
CONVENTION OF NORTH DAKOTA,JULY 4 TO AUGUST 17, 1889, at 437-38. Section 185 is in the Public

Debt and Public Works section of the North Dakota Constitution. See N.D. CoNST. art. X, 5 18.
Delegates who debated the provision did not discuss the "donation" aspect of the section, but were
concerned with only the "internal improvements" clause ofthe section. See OFFICIAI. REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF NORTH DAKOTA, JUI.Y

4 TO

AUGUST 17, 1889, at 437-38. Delegates were concerned with whether they wanted the State to engage
in any internal improvements, such as canal and irrigation projects. Id. at 438.

154. See S.D. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (1889, amended 1918). In 1918 South Dakota deleted the
donative language from § 1, but the reviser's notes give no indication of the reason this was clone. Id.
annot.
155. See MONT. CoNsT. art. XIII, § 1 (1889, repealed 1972). The Montana )rovision poviled:
Neither the state,... nor other subdivision of the state shall ever give or loan its credit
in aid of, or make any donation or grant . . . to any individual, association or
corporation, or become a subscriber to ....
shareholder in, . . . or a joint owner with
any person, company or corporation, except as to such ownership as nmay
accrueto tie"

state by operation or provision of law.
Id.
156. See id. annot.
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intended article 13, section 1 to prohibit the state or any political
subdivision from extending its credit or making donations to any
individual, association, or corporation. 15 7 This provision was a
direct response to the prevalent evils of new states giving aid to the
railroads in the later part of the nineteenth century. 158 Because the
North Dakota and Montana conventions took place in the same
year, it is arguable that the North Dakota delegates to the 1889
Constitutional Convention enacted section 185 based on similar
fears of public trust abuses. For this reason, section 185 may be
viewed as North Dakota's explicit acceptance of the public trust
doctrine and its corresponding-responsibilities.
Considering section 185, the issue becomes whether the State
of North Dakota, having acceded to the beds of navigable waters to
the high watermark as an incident of statehood, could
constitutionally give away any sovereign interest in the beds by the
operation of section 47-01-15 of the North Dakota Century
Code. 159 Although section 185 of the North Dakota Constitution is
in the finance and debt section of the document, the donative
language nevertheless applies to land title transactions. 160 No North
Dakota case law directly reaches the public trust lands issue.
Nevertheless, the North Dakota Supreme Court, in determining
whether the State of North Dakota can constitutionally give away
state property, has disregarded the placement of the donation
prohibition in the constitution and has literally interpreted the
statute. 161
157. See MONT. CODE ANN., MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 annot., at 240 (1949).
158. See State exrel. Cryderman v. Weinrich, 55 Mont. 390, 397-98, 170 P. 942, 945-46 (1918).
The railroad aid problem was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois Central
Railroadv. Illinoit, which has been termed the "lodestar" public trust doctrine case. See Illinois Cent.
R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). See generally H. ALTHAUS, PUBLIC TRUST RIGHTs 420 (1978).
The Court in Illinois Central held invalid an Illinois statute granting a railroad title to the submerged
lands under Lake Michigan. 146 U.S. at 453. The Court upheld the public trust doctrine, which
provides that the state holds title to the beds of navigable waters in trust for the public. Id. Further,
the Court found that such state control for this trust purpose could never be lost. Id.
Professor Sax has summed up Illinois Centralas providing that when a state holds property that is
"available for the free use of the general public," courts should look with skepticism upon any
conveyance by the state that re-allocates the resource to more restricted uses or that subjects public
uses to the self-interest of private parties. Sax, supra note 64, at 490.
159. See Beck, Boundary Litigation and Legislation in North Dakota, 41 N.D.L. REv. 424, 437 (1965).
Professor Beck framed the issue as whether "North Dakota can give away any land it owns." Id.
n.50. Professor Beck, however, failed to address the issue. See id. at 437 n.51, 461 n. 164.
160. See Solberg v. State, 78 N.D. 806, 53 N.W.2d 49 (1952) (statute transferring state real
property to individuals deemed a donation, which violated § 185 of the North Dakota Constitution).
161. SeeSolbergv. State, 78 N.D. 806, 53 N.W.2d 49 (1952); Herr v. Rudolf, 75 N.D. 91, 25
N.W.2d 916 (1947). The court in Solberg and Herraddressed whether the State of North Dakota has
authority to give away property it owns in its proprietary capacity. See Solberg, 78 N.D. at 813, 53
N.W.2d at 53; Herr, 75 N.D. at 102, 25 N.W.2d at 922. The discussion in this Note, however,
involves the authority of the State to give away property it owns in its sovereign capacity. Because
property owned by a state in its sovereign capacity is subject to the public trust doctrine, Solberg and
Herrcreate only minimum standards. Conveyances of sovereign lands are subject to stricter scrutiny.
See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 552 (1981) (strong presumption exists against the
conveyance oftrust lands by the sovereign); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892)
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In Herr v. Rudoif 62 the court declared that a statute 163 violated
1 64
section 20 and section 185 of the North Dakota Constitution.
The statute involved the sale of lands that became state property
5
through foreclosure of mortgages by the Bank of North Dakota.16
Before resale the statute allowed former owners to repurchase
foreclosed lands at the appraised value. 166 The court found that the
statute enabled former owners to buy at the appraised value,
167
although others were ready and willing to pay a greater price.
Therefore, the court determined that former owners received a
donation in an amount equal to the difference paid by former
owners and the amount the public was willing to pay. 168 The court
found that section 185 was enacted to prevent precisely such a
69
donation by the State. 1
Five years later, the North Dakota Supreme Court again
invalidated legislation on the grounds that it violated section 185 of
the North Dakota Constitution. 170 In Solberg v. State'7 ' the court
invalidated a statute 72 that released mineral reservations made by
an earlier statute. 173 The court reasoned that if the statute was
operative "it ha[d] the effect of transferring to certain designated
classes or individuals property of the state, held in trust for all the
(state may dispose of submerged lands in any manner so long as the disposition does not impair the
public interest).
162.75 N.D. 91, 25 N.W.2d 916 (1947).
163. See N.D. REVISED CODE § 6-0931 (1943, repealed 1945). Section 6-0931 provided in part:
The former owner, or any lineal descendant in the first degree of such former owner of
the land to be sold ... shall be notified by the Bank of North Dakota of such sale ten
days previous to the day ofsale, and shall be permitted to purchase the land or lands to
be sold at the appraised value on the terms of sale stated in subsection 4 of this section.
Id. § 6-0931(2).
164. Herr v. Rudolf, 75 N.D. 91, 102, 25 N.W.2d 916, 922 (1947). See N.D. CoNsr. art. I, § 20;
art. XII, § 185 (1960)(renumbered art. I, § 21; art. X, § 18 (1981)).
165. Herr, 75 N.D. at 102, 25 N.W.2d at 921.
166. Id. See N.D. REVISED CODE § 6-0931 (1943). For the text of § 6-0931 (2), see supra note 163.
167. 75 N.D. at 102, 25 N.W.2d at 922.
168. Id.
169. Id. The court reasoned that Rudolf would in effect receive a donation from the State in an
amount equal to the State's revenue loss. Id. The court found that such a donation was contrary to
the prohibition contained in § 185 of the North Dakota Constitution. Id.
170. SeeSolbergv. State, 78 N.D. 806,817, 53 N.W.2d 49, 55 (1952).
171. 78 N.D. 806.53 N.W.2d 49 (1952).
172. See Act of Feb. 28, 1951, ch. 231, § 2, 1951 N.D. Sess. Laws 324, 325 (codified at N.D.
CENT. CODE § 39-09-01.4, repealed by omission 1960). The statute provided:
Where the state or any of its departments have, subsequent to March 12, 1939, sold
lands to any person from whom the state derived title to such lands, . . . the state and
its departments shall release to such person any reservation of minerals made under
section 38-0901 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943, or under chapter 149 of
the 1939 session laws.
Act ofFeb. 28, 1951. ch. 231, § 2, 1951 N.D. Sess. Laws 324, 325.
173. Solberg, 78 N.D. at 809-10, 53 N.W.2d at 50-51. See N.D. REVISED CODE § 38-0901 (1943).
Section 38-0901 provided that "fifty percent of all oil, natural gas, or minerals which may be found
on or underlying" state land subject to transfer "shall be reserved to the state of North Dakota." Id.
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people thereof, as a gift." '174 Therefore, the court concluded that
the statute violated section 185 of the North Dakota Constitution
because in essence the State was making a donation to an
individual. 175
The court in Solberg v. State relied on a Kansas Supreme Court
opinion. 1 76 In Waters v. Myers1 7 7 the Kansas Supreme Court
invalidated a statute1 78 that declared islands formed along the banks
1 79
of streams to be accretions that belonged to the adjacent land.
This statute was contrary to existing law, which declared that such
islands were the property of Kansas. 18 0 The court in Waters found
that the effect of the act was to relinquish the title of the State to the
islands and to vest title in the owners of the lands along the
stream. 18 1 The court concluded that the statute effectively
transferred, without compensation, property belonging to all the
people of Kansas to a few individuals in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Kansas Constitution. 8 2 The Kansas court
reasoned that although equal protection is usually sought "by the
few against the many," it should be equally applicable "in behalf
of the people at large against legislation which would bestow their
property upon the few.' '183
The North Dakota Supreme Court liberally interpreted
section 185 of the North Dakota Constitution. The court held that
section 185 prevents the State from giving away property it
owns.' 84 The cases in which the court reached the issue, however,
involve property owned by the State in its proprietary capacity. 18 5
The present issue, however, involves property, the beds of
86
navigable waters, which the State owns in its sovereign capacity. 1
174. Solberg, 78 N.D. at 814,53 N.W.2d at 53.
175. Id. at 814, 53 N.W.2d at 53-54.
176. Id. at 816, 53 N.W.2d at 54.
177.92 Kan. 414, 140 P. 1033 (1914).
178. SeeActofFeb. 22, 1913, ch. 295, §9, 1913 Kan. Sess. Laws 506, 510.
179. Waters v. Myers, 92 Kan. 414, 427-28, 140 P. 1033, 1038 (1914).
180. 92 Kan. at -, 140 P. at 1034. See Act of Mar. 7, 1907, ch. 378, § 1, 1907 Kan. Sess.
Laws 544.
181. 92 Kan. at 427-28, 140 P. at 1038.
182. Id. See KAN. CONs-r. Bill of Rights, § 2. Section 2 of the Bill of Rights of the Kansas
Constitution provides that free governments are instituted for the equal protection and benefit of the
people. Id.
183. 92 Kan. at 428, 140 P. at 1038.
184. See Solberg v. State, 78 N.D. 806, 816-17, 53 N.W.2d 49, 55 (1952); Herr v. Rudolf, 75
N.D. 91, 102, 25 N.W.2d 916, 922 (1947).
185. See Solberg, 78 N.D. at 813, 53 N.W.2d at 53 (state holds mineral rights as security); Herr,
75 N.D. at 98, 25 N.W.2d at 920 (lands held as an asset to a bond trust fund).
186. E.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892); State v. Longycar Holding
Co., 224 Minn. 451, 29 N.W.2d 657 (1947). The court in Longyear found that states own the beds of
navigable waters in their sovereign rather than their proprietary capacity. 224 Minn. at 472, 29
N.W.2d at 669. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that the word "sovereign" is intended to
indicate that "the state held such title in trust for the people, for the purposes of public navigation,
commerce, and fishing, and hence that it could not divide or parcel the same for sale as it might other
lands. " Id. at 472, 29 N.W.2d at 669-70.
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Yet, the interpretation the North Dakota Supreme Court gave
section 185 should be equally applicable to property the State holds
in its sovereign capacity. 187 Arguably, this application is even more
appropriate because sovereign lands are also subject to the public
188
trust doctrine.
The Dakota Territory version of section 47-01-15189 could not
convey the beds of navigable waters to riparians because when
North Dakota was a part of the territory, such beds were held in
trust by the United States for future states. 190 Likewise, after
North Dakota became a state, section 47-01-15 could not operate
as a grant of a property interest to riparians because section 185 of
the North Dakota Constitution prevents the State from giving away
its property. 19 1 Because section 47-01-15 is presumptively valid,
however, the statute must be construed, if possible, in a way that
renders it valid. 192 Section 47-01-15 construed as a license 93 is
compatible with the North Dakota Constitution.
VI. SECTION 47-01-15 CONSTRUED AS A LICENSE
Section 47-01-15 may be construed as a conveyance of a mere
license to riparians to use the navigable bed to the low watermark in
a manner consistent with the State's sovereign ownership and
corresponding public trust responsibilities. 194 Because a license is
The Court in Illinois Central held that title to beds of navigable waters is held in trust for the
people of the state and cannot be lost. 146 U.S. at 453. The Court defined title to land that states own
in their proprietary capacity as title "which the state holds in lands intended for sale." Id.
187. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452.
188. Id.
189. See TERR. DAK. Civ. CODE § 266 (1877).
190. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 551.
191. SeeSolberg, 78 N.D. at 814, 53 N.W.2d at 53-54; Herr, 75 N.D. at 102, 25 N.W.2d at 922.
192. See Paluck v. Board of County Comm'rs, 307 N.W.2d 852 (N.D. 1981). The court in
Paluck stated that an enactment of the legislature is presumed constitutional and that courts will construe statutes to harmonize with the constitution whenever possible. Id. at 857. The court noted that
a presumption exists in favor of the propriety and constitutionality of legislation and that improper
motives in its enactment are never imputed to the legislature. Id. at 857-58. The court laid down
guidelines for squaring provisions of the North Dakota Century Code with the state constitution; the
court found "that if a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one which will be compatible with
constitutional provisions or one which will render the statute unconstitutional, we must adopt the
construction which will make the statute valid." Id. at 856.
193. See People v. Henderson, 391 Mich. 612, 218 N.W.2d 2 (1975); White v. Knickerbocker
Ice Co., 241 N.Y.S. 898, 172 N.E. 452 (1930). The court in Henderson defined a license as "the
permission by competent authority to do an act which, without such permission, would be illegal."
391 Mich. at 616, 218 N.W.2d at 4. The White court reasoned that because the beds of navigable
waters have the same general incidents of property as other real property, use of such lands without
172 N.E. at 455.
the permission of the proprietor constitutes a trespass. 241 N.Y.S. at -,
Arguably, a riparian who uses the beds other than in exercising his ordinary riparian rights, which
include access and reasonable use of the water, trespasses on the property of the United States during
territorial days and on the property of the State of North Dakota after statehood.
194. See IA G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 217 (1980
repl.). The permission granted a licensee "carries with it [the] authority and a right, by implication,
to do all that is necessary to effect the principal objects and to avail the licensee of his rights under the
license." Id. § 222, at 215.
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not a property right or interest, 195 such an interpretation would be
consistent with section 185 of the North Dakota Constitution.
Furthermore, this interpretation is consistent with the State of
North Dakota's treatment of its title to the beds of navigable
96
waters. 1
Under this interpretation the license could be viewed as
created when the Dakota Territory counterpart to section 47-01-15
was enacted in the Revised Code of 1877.197 Furthermore, a court
could logically reason that this license survived statehood because it
was reaffirmed in the North Dakota Revised Code of 1905.198
Finally, because the statute has remained unchanged to date,
except for an addition to the headnote language in the Revised
Code of 1943,199 the logical inference is that the license continues to
exist. Such a license might allow a riparian to "pasture his cattle
thereon and to gather firewood therefrom; but he would acquire no
private rights over such lands as against the public.' '200 The rights
provided riparians by this license are subject to revocation by the
State of North Dakota by repeal of section 47-01-15 or by
legislation to the contrary. 20 ' Most importantly, however, this
interpretation would not operate to confer on or vest in the riparian
any title, interest, or estate in the sovereign lands subject to the
license. 202
The State of North Dakota has not revoked permission to use
the beds as provided in section 47-01-15, but has entrusted the
control and management of state navigable streams and waters,
including the beds, to state agencies 20 3 such as the Garrison
Diversion Conservancy
District. 20 4
These management
195. SeeAsbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 72 N.D. 359, 384, 7 N.W.2d 438, 452 (1943).
196. For a discussion of North Dakota's treatment of the beds of navigable waters, see supra note
8 and accompanying text.
197. TERR. DAK. Civ. CODE § 266 (1877) (currently codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15

(1978)).
198. See N.D. REVISED CODE § 4809 (1905) (currently codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15

(1978)).
199. See N.D. REVISED CODE § 47-0115 (1943). In 1943, the phrase "Boundary ofownership"
was added to "Banks and beds of streams" in the headnote of the statute. The reviser's notes state
that the headnotes were "[r]evised for clarity without change in meaning." CODE REVISION COMM'N,
CODE REVISION REPORT COVERING WORK OF THE CODE REVISION COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE 28TH
SESS. OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY § 47-0115 reviser's note (1944).
200.2 P. NICHOLS, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN §5.32 (1981).
201. See IA G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 217 (1980

repl.). In his treatment of licenses, Professor Thompson states that "fs]ince a license is a mere
permission it survives only as long as the permission exists." Id. See Hoboken v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
124 U.S. 656 (1888). In Hoboken the Court held that the beds of navigable waters belong to the public
and at common law the riparian owner had "no peculiar rights in this public domain as incidents of
his estate." Id. at 690. The Court held, therefore, that any rights the riparian possessed by local
custom or legislative enactment may be revoked at the will of the legislature. Id.
202. See Lee v. North Dakota Park Serv., 262 N.W.2d 467, 473 (N.D. 1977) (license does not
convey an interest or estate in the land).
203. See supra note 7.
204. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-24-08(13) (Supp. 1981). Subsection 13 provides:
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responsibilities include the State's public trust responsibilities.205
The State has not abdicated the trust, 20 6 but merely placed these
public trust responsibilities with the board of directors of the
Garrison Diversion Conservancy District. 20 7 Arguably, the board
has the same authority to use the beds in exercising its management
responsibilities as the State did prior to conferring this power on the
board. This authority would include using the beds contrary to the
license of riparians and revoking the license when it conflicts with
20 8
the board's management duties.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the early 1970s a greater awareness of the public trust
responsibilities of a state to its citizenry has emerged. Among these
responsibilities is the protection of the state's sovereign public trust
lands, most notably the beds of navigable waters. To most
effectively protect these interests, a state must identify and assert its
authority over these properties. This protection of the public
interest is exemplified by an action brought by the State of North
Dakota to quiet title to the bed of the Little Missouri River. Yet the
State's duty does not end there. The State must reassert its title to
the beds of navigable waters to the ordinary high watermark.
When North Dakota entered the Union it acceded to
ownership of the beds of navigable waters to the high watermark.
Nevertheless, the North Dakota Supreme Court has interpreted a
[The board of directors of the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District shall have the
power] [tio exercise the control and management, including the power to dedicate to
public use or to donate and convey to the United States for authorized purposes of the
Garrison Diversion Unit, lands owned by the state of North Dakota in navigable
streams and waters, including the bed thereof, where such lands lie within the district,
as now constituted or may hereafter be modified west of the ninety-eighth meridian.
Id. Section 61-24-08 of the North Dakota Century Code outlines the powers and duties of the board
ofodirectors of the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District. See id. § 61-24-08. Section 61-24-08 may
be viewed as a reaffirmation of the State's ownership of the beds of navigable waters and its inherent
public trust responsibilities.
205. Id.
206. See State v. Dakota County, 250 Iowa 318, 93 N.W.2d 595 (1958). The Iowa Supreme
93
Court noted that mistakes of state officials cannot deprive a state of its property. Id. at -,
N.W.2d at 599. See N.D. CONs?. art. IX, S 9 (state title to public lands cannot be lost through claims
ofadverse possession). For the text ofart. IX, § 9, see supra note 25.
207. SeeN.D. Cent. Code § 61-24-08(13)(Supp. 1981).
208. With one exception, the management responsibilities of the board of directors of the
Garrison Diversion Conservancy District are not enumerated in the North Dakota Century Code.
The exception provides that the board has "the power to dedicate to public use or to donate and
convey to the United States" lands within the conservancy district. N.D. CENT. CooE § 61-24-08(13)
(Supp. 1981). Conceivably, the board could do nothing and continue to allow riparians to use the
beds. This action would be consistent with the practice of the State of North Dakota since statehood.
On the other end of the spectrum, the board could convey the beds of navigable waters to the United
States as provided in the Century Code. See id. This action would terminate any existing riparian
licenses to use the beds. See 1A G. THOMPSON, supra note 194, § 224 (permission or license is
withdrawn by alienation of the property affected by the license).

240

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

state statute to grant that portion of the beds between the high and
low watermarks to riparians. Such an interpretation is contrary to a
provision of the North Dakota Constitution, which prohibits the
State from giving away state property. Therefore, the State of
North Dakota should plead and the courts should address this
ownership issue so that the public interest in the State's sovereign
lands may be protected.
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